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Land Titling in Peru: Is it Fulfilling its Promise? 
 
Land titling, the formal registration of land that had previously been used without formal title, is a 
policy that has been implemented or is under consideration in much of Latin America and the rest of the 
developing world.  As insecurity of tenure is seen to be a significant constraint to development, titling is 
usually intended to facilitate access to formal credit and encourage investment in the land, thereby 
increasing farm productivity and production. It is also possible that with secure ownership rights, farmers 
will become better stewards of the land and be more likely to adopt conservation techniques.  Titling 
could also stimulate and strengthen land markets, which could encourage the transfer of land to more 
productive producers and/or lead to reconcentration of land ownership.  As the beneficiaries of titling 
are often among the poorest in the countries concerned, understanding the effects of this program is 
imperative.   
The general objective of this paper is to examine the effect of land titling in coastal Peru on the 
beneficiaries of this program.  Specifically, we will examine the effects of land titling on access to credit, 
on-farm investment, the use of conservation techniques and the functioning of land markets. We will 
examine if farmers have greater access to credit after receiving titles and how that access may vary 
depending on farm or farmer characteristics. We intend to determine if farmers change their farming 
techniques to enhance the long-term viability of production once they have security of tenure. We will 
also examine if titling improves fluidity in the land market, and if so, if small farmers and tenants are 
accessing that market. 
 
Theoretical significance 
  Government-issued land titles are hypothesized to encourage rural development through three 
avenues. First, land titles are meant to facilitate access to credit (the ‘collateral effect’).  Banks value 
them as collateral, so it is hypothesized that titling increases access to formal credit.  Second, by 
protecting land holders' rights to the land against competing claims, titles are intended to increase 
landholders' sense of tenure security and therefore make them more likely to be better stewards of the 
land and to make long-term investments in the land (the ‘security’ or ‘investment effect’). Finally, titles   3  
also facilitate transfers as they show the possessor of the titled land is truly the owner and has the right 
to transfer this ownership to others.  This means that with improved factor mobility, the land is more 
likely to find its way to the most productive producer (the ‘transaction effect’).  We intend to examine 
each of these three issues. 
1.  Access to credit 
  Land has long been used as valuable collateral as it is immobile and relatively immune to 
damage.  Because titles establish clear ownership, banks value them as collateral, as long as there are 
no social or political restrictions on foreclosure.  The lack of title lessens the value of land as collateral 
because the owner may not have the uncontested ability to transfer the land to the bank in case of 
default on a loan.  Although most developing countries have informal credit markets open to untitled 
farmers, the interest rates are generally much higher due to greater risk. 
  As credit is often needed in order to purchase inputs and make productivity-enhancing 
improvements, understanding restrictions in the credit markets is essential to fostering economic growth 
and development.  Two commonly recognized factors that may limit the access of poor households to 
credit markets are fixed transaction costs and ‘incomplete information’  (Bradford et al., 1996).  Fixed 
transactions costs are the cost of the loan application that do not vary with the size of the loan, such as 
preparing the application and assessing the viability of the project.  Because these costs are fixed, they 
are relatively greater for small loans and may therefore make the cost of these small loans prohibitive.  
‘Incomplete information’ refers to the difficulty the lender faces in determining the risk of the loan.  
While incomplete information is a cost to the lender for all types of loans, there could be a bias against 
the poor if wealth is used to determine the risk of the loan or if social relations and the reputation of the 
borrower favor wealthier borrowers.  Because poor households are especially likely to be credit-
constrained, an understanding of the effect of titling on access to credit for these farmers is important for 
equity considerations. 
2.  Investment in conservation and improvements 
  In addition to facilitating access to credit (the ‘collateral effect’ described above), titles are 
intended to increase landholders’ sense of tenure security and therefore make them more likely to make 
investments in practices that enhance the long-term viability of agricultural production, such as installing   4  
irrigation systems.  If farmers fear eviction and are not certain that they will be able to reap the future 
rewards of present investment, they will be disinclined to make such investment.  This is referred to as 
the ‘security’ or ‘investment effect.’ 
  The third theory linking property rights and increased investment involves ‘gains from trade’ 
(Besley, 1995; Wachter, 1992).  If enhanced property rights facilitate land sales, by reducing risk to 
potential buyers, owners would be encouraged to invest in the land, confident that they will receive 
compensation for their investment.   
3.  Functioning land markets 
  Secure ownership is also required for a fully functioning market in land, which facilitates the 
transfer of land to the most productive user (the ‘transaction effect’).  Without clear and definite claims 
to the land, farmers will have difficulty transferring secure ownership rights to others, increasing 
transaction costs and limiting land markets.  Insecurity similarly reduces the market value of land to 
buyers because they cannot be sure that a third party does not have claim to the land.  In this sense, 
security of ownership refers not only to the present owner but also to any future owners.   
  Atwood (1990) explain Johnson’s (1972) view of how customary tenure can restrict sales.  
Under a system of secure property rights in land, more productive farmers buy land from less 
productive farmers, resulting in a net gain to both.  This can happen because ‘farmer B,’ the more 
productive farmer, expects to gain more production from the land than ‘farmer A,’ the less productive 
farmer, and is therefore willing to pay more for it than ‘farmer A’ thinks it is worth.  The risk and 
transaction costs of customary transfers reduce the return expected by ‘farmer B’ who naturally reduces 
his or her offer price, possibly to the point that the sale does not take place.  The results are a loss in 
total production and a leftward shift in the demand curve for land with lower prices and fewer sales. 
  As land transfers are facilitated by titling, a concern will be whether the market is actually able to 
transfer land to more productive users, as hypothesized, and related to that question, if people with few 
financial resources of their own are able to access that market.  It has been hypothesized that poor 
people, even if more productive, may not be able to purchase land because of imperfections in the 
markets for land and capital (Carter and Mesbah, 1990; Shearer et al., 1991; Stringer, 1989).  Land 
markets generally violate the criteria for a ‘perfect market,’ and in the developing world, the violations   5  
are even more pronounced.  As with credit, fixed costs for land sales disproportionately affect the sale 
of small parcels of land.  Many transfer costs, such as registering the title, are fixed and are therefore 
especially onerous for the purchasers of small parcels of land. 
  In bimodal land ownership systems, as are generally found in Latin America, the market for land 
is divided into two sub-markets, one for large and another for small units.  Typically small farmers sell 
land to other small farmers and large farmers sell to other large farmers, although the large-unit market 
controls the majority of the land and is less active than the small. Large units are generally not 
subdivided, reducing the amount of land within the price range of small producers.  Social factors also 
limit the movement of land from one sub-market to another (Dorner and Saliba, 1981). 
  There are two competing hypotheses for the effect of an active land market on the structure of 
land holdings under imperfect market conditions.  The first is that the market will promote a more 
efficient allocation between small and large producers and will gradually transform the agrarian structure 
by transferring land to the land poor.  Due to higher utilization of labor and lower labor costs on small 
farms, smaller producers will be able to outbid larger producers because of the widely documented 
inverse relationship between size and land productivity (Barraclough, 1970; Barry and Cline, 1979; 
DeJanvry and Sadoulet, 1989; Dovring, 1970; Griffin, 1976; Thiesenhusen, 1989).  The second 
hypothesis is that with multiple imperfect markets, market activation will shift resources to farms of the 
scale of production which are best positioned to expand because of advantages in other markets, i.e. 
capital markets. 
  Carter and Mesbah (1990) explain the Carter-Kalfayan model, which suggests that the second 
hypothesis is more likely to be true.  Although imperfect labor markets favor small farmers, these 
advantages may be outweighed by imperfect capital markets. The advantage of large farms in capital 
markets is brought about by several factors.  First, this advantage is created by government subsidies 
for credit, which generally flow to large producers because they have the access to information required 
to take advantage of these subsidies.  Secondly, within the credit market, the perceived risk and 
relatively higher transaction costs of lending to small farmers make lenders reluctant to offer credit to 
small producers.  When the advantages of the credit market to large producers are greater than those of 
the labor market to small producers, increased activity in land markets could lead to increased   6  
concentration of land holdings.  In addition, fixed transaction costs favor purchases of large units of land 
because they increase the per unit price of land in small units, thereby providing an additional force 
toward increased concentration of land ownership. 
 
Previous evaluations of land titling projects 
  Previous studies of land titling have yielded mixed and tenuous results.  Studies from Thailand 
(Feder, 1987; Feder and Onchan, 1987, 1989; Feder et al., 1988; Feder and Feeny, 1991), 
comparing farmers squatting on public forest reserve land with farmers producing on privately owned 
and operated land, indicated that titles did increase access to formal credit and stimulate investment.  
However, studies of land registration programs in African countries (Atwood, 1990; Barrows and Roth, 
1990; Coldham, 1979; Haugerud, 1983; Hunter and Mabbs-Zeno, 1986; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991) 
have not found a solid link between land titles and the use of credit, as credit markets are weak in these 
countries.  Besely (1995) did find that investment is significantly related to property rights, though it does 
not seem to be caused by the ‘collateral effect.’ 
  Research from Latin America suggests that titling does not affect all farmers uniformly.  Some 
studies found that titles do facilitate access to credit and encourage investment, but that these results are 
limited to or most pronounced for mid-sized to larger farms (Carter and Olinto, 1996; Lopez, 1996; 
Seligson, 1982).  Others found positive results only when land titling was combined with access to 
technical assistance and credit (Larson et al., 1999; Saenz and Knight, 1971; Seligson, 1982).   
Stanfield (1990) in an evaluation of various titling projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
highlighted the strength of customary systems of land tenure and also emphasized the importance of 
access to credit, technical assistance and markets. 
 
Peruvian context 
The Government of Peru has received funds from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
to carry out a land titling and registration project, the Proyecto Especial de Titulación de Tierras y 
Catastro Rural (PETT).  According to the IDB project report, one of the general objectives of this 
project is to support “the establishment off a rural land market in Peru that operates in an open, flexible   7  
and transparent fashion through conclusive regularization of the ownership of all holdings created under 
the agrarian reform.”  Titling under this project started in September of 1996, primarily in the coastal 
region. 
Peru’s agrarian reform of 1969 granted land under various types of organizational structures, 
with agricultural production cooperatives (Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción, or CAPs) one of the 
most common forms of production in the coastal region.  Starting in the early 1980s, much of this land 
was informally divided among the members of the cooperative, or ‘parceled.’  Following parcelization, 
most CAPs changed to agricultural cooperatives of ‘users’ (Cooperativas Agrarias de Usuarios, or 
CAUs).  While most of the land of CAUs was under individual cultivation, some land and most of the 
capital assets were still held collectively.  These CAPs and CAUs were among the first lands to have 
received title. 
Both parcelization and informal settlement have led to the vast majority of farmers in Peru 
lacking formal rights of tenure to their land.  Data from the 1994 agricultural census indicate that only 24 
percent of all landowners had a registered and valid title.  The government of Peru has attempted to 
change this through several measures.  A number of laws passed in the early 1990s facilitated and 
encouraged farmers to title their land.  The incentive to register one’s land was increased in 1992 with 
the closing of the state agrarian bank.  The closing of this bank meant that access to formal credit was 
essentially beyond the reach of those without formal title to their land.  The new Constitution of 1993 
and the ‘Law of Lands’ of 1995 increased the tenure security of large landholders by eliminating ceilings 
on the amount of land that can be owned and by restricting expropriation.  This also halted the granting 
of State-owned land, which can now be acquired only through public auction.  Finally, the PETT was 
started in 1996.  In 1997, the stakes were increased when a law was passed which allows for the 
expropriation of idle land held by campesino communities on the coast. 
The 1995 Censo Agropecurio found that one of the principal limitations to the development of 
economically productive activities in rural areas is the difficulty of accessing credit (Trivelli, 1997). The 
lack of financing is so severe that much land lies idle because farmers cannot afford the expense of 
cultivation.  Only 16.4 percent of households in rural areas used credit, and less than three percent used 
formal sources (Instituto Cuánto, 1995).  Land and credit markets in Peru are inter-related – land   8  
ownership facilitates access to credit, and a lack of finance to cultivate the land is one of the main 
reasons small farmers offer land for sale, rent or share-cropping (Ugaz, 1997).  In addition, the 
limitations of the land market weaken the value of a title as collateral, because the bank will have not be 
able to sell the land and cancel the debt in a reasonable time period (Barrantes and Trivelli, 1994). 
In part because of a lack of credit and in part because less productive farmers without clear 
titles to their land have been prevented from selling land to more productive farmers, Trivelli and Abler 
(1997) found substantial differences in land productivity between farms with title and farms without title.  
Their estimates of the value marginal product of land for both titled irrigated land and titled unirrigated 
land were positive and statistically significant, while estimates were very close to zero in magnitude and 
not statistically significant for either untitled irrigated land or untitled unirrigated land. 
 
Description of the study area
1 
The Valley of Huaral, one of the richest valleys on the Peruvian coast, is about 80 kilometers 
north of Lima.  The Valley is fairly well integrated into input and output markets, as agricultural inputs 
are readily available, there are several banks, and Lima provides a market for much of its produce. 
With 22,000 hectares appropriate for cultivation, about 78 percent of agricultural land in the 
Valley is in the hands of small farmers (less than 50 hectares).  There are on the order of 1,000 small 
farms, and their average size is about 5 hectares.  Most small farmers acquired their land through the 
‘parcelization’ of cooperatives, while only 5.6 percent purchased their land.  Nearly all of the farmers 
have some sort of document indicating ownership of their land, and roughly 70 percent have received 
titles through the current titling project. 
The land market in Huaral is limited.  The index of mobility, which indicates the percentage of 
the land sold within the year, was 1.8 percent in 1992, while in other parts of rural Latin America, the 
indices are generally twice that level.  Markets for renting and sharecropping are also poorly developed, 
with the result that much land lies idle.  Most of the transactions that do take place are between friends 
and family members.  It is especially significant that land markets have not developed in Huaral, since 
this region has access to markets and has a high proportion of titled land.   9  
In spite of the presence of banks, there is little formal agricultural credit in Huaral.  Banks could 
be hesitant to make loans to small farmers for a number of reasons.  Other sectors are more profitable 
and have lower lending costs, and, even with titling, there are social restrictions on foreclosure.  There 
are however, informal sources of credit.  Merchants and suppliers are the main sources of credit, and 
most of those who receive credit have a personal or professional relationship with the lender.  The loans 
are short-term (less than nine months), and most of the informal loans had negative real interest rates.  
However, most loans were usually repaid in kind, and the loaner generally offered a below-market 
price, pushing up the effective market rate to the borrower.  Formal guarantees were rarely used in 
these loans. 
 
Characteristics of survey farms 
  In the valley of Huaral, a sample of 304 farms was randomly selected by the Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos (IEP) for inclusion in the study.  Of these farms, 283 reported they were currently 
working agricultural land.  These farms were surveyed between January and March 1999.  The 
questionnaire included questions on tenure status, agricultural production, conservation practices and 
other on-farm investments, involvement in land markets and the use of credit, both formal and informal.  
Farmers were asked about their perceptions of titling and about demographic characteristics of the 
household.  All farms in the study are irrigated, and, as the area study is small, it is assumed there are no 
significant differences in land quality. 
  The average age of the farmers was 60 years, and the average household size was 4.5 
members.  The farmers surveyed have varying levels of formal education.  Roughly one-eighth of the 
farmers (12 percent) have had no formal education, while a further 56 percent have completed primary 
school.  Twenty-five percent of farmers have completed secondary school, and 7 percent of farmers 
have some post-secondary education.  When asked about their primary occupation, 76 percent of 
respondents listed agriculture, followed by 21 percent who classified themselves primarily as employees.   
Similar to other farms in the Valley, the average farm size was 4.2 hectares (6.7 acres), and 
nearly all the farms had less than 10 hectares.  Farms with less than 2 hectares comprised 23 percent of 
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the sample, while half the farms had 2 to 4.9 hectares.  A further 22 percent of farms had 5 to 9.9 
hectares and the remaining 5 percent had between 10 and 22 hectares. 
  Sixty-five percent of farmers had a registered title for their land, and another 7.8 percent were 
in the process of receiving a title.  Seventeen percent of farms had another document indicating 
ownership of the land, such as a ‘certificate of possession’ or a ‘document of inheritance,’ while the 
remaining ten percent had no document at all.  For the purpose of this paper, only the farms that 
currently possess a registered title will be considered ‘titled.’  While there were still some group farms in 
the area, nearly all of the farmers surveyed (96 percent) farmed individually.  Rather surprisingly, there 
was no correlation between tenure status and farm organization.  Only a small share of the farmers (8.6 
percent) received title to their land through the PETT (since 1996).  Nearly 10 percent of the farms 
were titled before 1970, a further 28 percent received title in the 1970s, 44 percent were titled in the 
1980s and 10 percent were titled between 1990 and 1995. 
  One-twelfth of respondents indicated they had agricultural land that was idle.  As previous 
studies have found, the primary reason the land was not being worked was a lack of finance, cited by 
42 percent of those with idle land.  Again confirming previous research, there was little rental of 
agricultural land as only one respondent was farming rented land. 
 Agriculture was the primary source of these farmers’ income, as they received an average of 82 
percent of their income from this source.  However, titled farmers received a higher proportion of their 
income from agriculture than did untitled farmers, as some 56 percent of titled farmers received all of 
their income from agriculture, while only 38 percent of untitled farmers did so.  A Chi-square test 
showed this difference to be statistically significant at 5 percent.  In related questions, 42 percent of all 
households had a member employed off the farm and 20 percent of the households had a member who 
received a pension. 
  The survey farms were market-integrated, as they overwhelmingly produce for the market.  
Twenty-five percent list cotton as the primary crop, 28 percent mentioned fruits and 29 percent raise 
primarily vegetables.  Input use is also widespread.  Nearly all farms use chemical fertilizers (97 percent) 
and pesticides (99 percent).  However, statistically significant differences in the rates of use of these 
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inputs between farms with and without title were evident.  While 99 percent of farms with title used 
chemical fertilizer, only 95 percent of those without title did so (Table 1).  All farmers with title reported 
using pesticides while only 96 percent of untitled farms did so.  While none of the untitled farms used 
soil analysis, 6 percent of the titled farms did so.  Titled farms were also more likely to use the 
conservation technique of minimum tillage (65 percent compared to 58 percent) and slightly more likely 
to have waterways (6 percent versus 5 percent).  While the difference was not statistically significant, 
untitled farms were more likely to have some irrigation canals constructed from a material other than dirt 
than were titled farms, as 7.5 percent of untitled farms had such canals compared to 4.4 percent of titled 
farms. 
  As previous research has found, land market activity is limited in Huaral.  Only 4.6 percent of 
the farmers bought land in the previous five years and only 5.3 percent sold land in the same time 
period.  The land involved in these transactions had a higher rate of land titling, as 80 percent of the land 
sold and 71 percent of the parcels purchased had registered titles, compared to 65 percent of all 
parcels.  All of the land purchases were financed by the buyer’s own funds or with the assistance of 
family members, indicating the lack of commercial bank involvement in financing the purchase of 
agricultural land. 
Survey farmers had greater involvement in the credit market than the national average, as 40 
percent of farms received agricultural credit in the previous three years.  Of these, 15 percent received 
loans from a formal bank, 14 percent from an informal commercial source such as a supplier, merchant 
or processor and 4.6 percent from a government source.  The remaining 6 percent received loans from 
family or friends.   While informal commercial sources provided many farmers with credit, the loan 
amounts were smaller and duration of the loan shorter than those of loans from commercial banks– 6 
months compared to 13 months (Table 2).  Related to the short time-frame for repayment of the loan, 
nearly all of the loans regardless of the source were used for inputs (82 percent) or a combination of 
inputs and farm machinery (13 percent).  Interest rates could not be compared as many loans from 
informal commercial sources were in-kind, and repayment included a reduced price for the commodity.  
Factors that influence the use of credit from various sources will be explored further in a following 
section.   12  
The use of credit varied by farm size.  Only 17 percent of farms with less than 2 hectares 
received credit, compared to 52 percent of those with 5 to 9.9 hectares and 47 percent of those with 
10 hectares or more.  A Chi-square test showed these differences to be statistically significant at 1 
percent. 
 
Farmer perceptions of land titling 
Farmers’ opinions about the value of land titles were assessed through a series of questions.  
Overall, they believed titles enhance access to credit and increase land values.  Nearly all farmers, (87 
percent) stated that those with title had greater access to credit in general, and 68 percent said their own 
access to credit had improved since they received a title to their land.  Forty-four percent reported that 
having a title had allowed them to obtain credit from a formal source that without a title, they could not 
access, and 27 percent reported that having a title had provided access to informal sources of credit.  
They were uncertain of the effect of titles on the terms of loans.  Twenty-three percent thought title had 
no effect on the interest rate of loans, while 18 percent thought those with title received higher rates and 
18 percent thought the rates would be lower.  A plurality of farmers (43 percent) thought a title would 
increase the amount of credit received, while 16 percent thought it would make no difference.  The 
process of obtaining credit using the title as a guarantee was perceived to be more difficult by 36 
percent of respondents, while only 9 percent thought it was easier.   
  Eighty-two percent of respondents believed titles increase the value of the land.  The most 
commonly cited reasons were that titles enhance access to credit (57 percent) and facilitate selling the 
land (21 percent).  Other reasons included clarification of property rights, facilitating inheritance and 
simply that titles increase the selling price of land.  Of those lacking title to their land, 86 percent were 
interested in obtaining title.  The reasons they gave were to increase security (73 percent), to enhance 
access to credit (44 percent), to obtain credit from a formal source (30 percent), to sell the land (10 
percent) and to facilitate inheritance (5.1 percent)
2.  Interestingly, respondents cited all the theoretical 
benefits of titling. 
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  Given the perceived benefits of titiling, one wonders why roughly a third of the parcels remained 
untitled.  Anecdotal evidence suggests the lack of required documents for the land is a hurdle for some 
who would like to title their land.  The difficulty of obtaining formal credit even with a title is a further 
disincentive to titling.  The share of farms titled differed by the amount of land owned.  The smallest 
quarter of farms had a titling rate of 45 percent compared to 70 percent for the largest quarter.  It may 
be that small farms were less likely to have the documentation required for titling, or perhaps owners of 




Because access to credit is critical for individual farmer’s ability to purchase inputs and for rural 
development more broadly, analysis focused on this issue.  To determine the effect of land titling and 
other farm and farmer characteristics on access to credit, a set of tobit models was estimated.  Tobit 
analysis is used for analysis of censored data, such as the use of credit, censored at zero.  Three tobit 
models were estimated: the first for the total amount of credit received from all sources, the second for 
the amount of loans received from commercial banks and the third for loans received from informal 
commercial lenders.  The estimated variables were defined as follows: 
Dependent Variables: 
Log total credit   =   the log of the total amount of credit received (in U.S. dollars) from all 
sources in the previous three years. 
Log bank credit   =   the log of the amount of credit received (in U.S. dollars) from 
commercial banks in the previous three years. 
Log informal credit   =    the log of the amount of credit received (in U.S. dollars) from informal 
commercial lenders in the previous three years. 
Independent Variables: 
Log total land   =   the log of the total hectares of agricultural land owned. 
Title   =  1 if the farmer owns land with a registered title, and 0 otherwise. 
Log % farm income  =  the log of the proportion of total income from agricultural sources.   14  
Cotton  =  1 if the primary crop grown on the farm was cotton, and 0 otherwise. 
Fruit  =  1 if the primary crop grown on the farm was a fruit, and 0 otherwise. 
Vegetable  =  1 if the primary crop grown on the farm was a vegetable, and 0 
otherwise. 
Log age  =   the log of the age of the head of the household. 
Log education  =   the log of the level of education completed by the head of the 
household. 
The descriptive statistics for these variables are in Table 3.  As many observations lacked data on 
farmer characteristics, the sample size for the analysis is 135.   
  The tobit model for total credit received in the previous three years comprises all sources of 
credit including commercial banks, informal commercial lenders, government sources and other informal 
sources such as family or friends and non-governmental organizations.  The results of this model, shown 
in Table 4, indicate that farm size and cultivating commercial products, including cotton, fruits and 
vegetables are all positively associated with the amount of credit received
3.  Having a registered title is 
not a significant factor in determining the total amount of credit received from all sources. 
    A comparison of the models for credit from commercial banks and informal commercial lenders, 
(Table 5), shows the differing factors considered by these two types of lenders.  In the model for 
commercial banks, both farm size and having a registered title positively affected access to credit, while 
the coefficients for various commodities were not significant.  Conversely, in the regression for credit 
from informal commercial lenders, only farm size was statistically significant and positive.  This shows 
that while larger farms have access to credit from either source, those with title have greater access to 
the higher loan amounts and lower interest rates of the commercial banks. 
 
Policy-related significance 
The problem of tenure insecurity in Latin America is widespread – it has been estimated that 
some 70 percent of all farmers in Latin America lack secure legal title to their land.  As land titling 
projects are designed and implemented in other countries, the valleys on the coast of Peru provide an 
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especially significant case to study as farmers in this region are fairly well integrated into markets and use 
modern production techniques.  Because of this market integration, this region could potentially support 
a dynamic land market and provide information as to how small farmers are able to compete in such a 
market.   
The issues investigated in this paper, access to credit, on-farm investment and the functioning of 
land markets, are inter-related and play a critical role in rural development.  The lack of financing has 
been clearly identified as a constraint to agricultural production in rural Peru.  Several farmers in the 
study even left land idle because they lacked the financing to cultivate it.  While 40 percent of surveyed 
farmers received agricultural credit (high for rural Peru), less than one-half of these received the loan 
from a commercial bank.  Land titles facilitate access to formal credit, but the process of using land as 
collateral in commercial banks is arduous and expensive, limiting its use.  Small farmers’ access to credit 
is still limited, as only 17 percent of farms with less than 2 hectares received credit. 
  On-farm investment is essential to improve productivity and maintain the sustainability of 
production.  All farms in the study, titled and untitled, have generally high rates of input use.  However, 
titled farms do exhibit greater use of some inputs and conservation techniques.  This may be due to 
enhanced access to formal credit, the collateral effect, or it may be due to greater feelings of tenure 
security. 
Finally, fully functioning land markets could serve to transfer land to the most productive users.  
This could provide the land-poor with access to land or it could lead to a reconcentration of land 
ownership and exacerbate rural poverty and rural-urban migration.  Because land markets are limited, 
there is no widespread movement of land to more efficient producers, nor is there evidence of 
reconcentration of land ownership.  Limitations in the credit market exacerbate sluggishness in the land 
market. 
The analysis of the survey data indicates land titling in the Valley of Huaral is having some of its 
intended effects.  Access to formal credit, especially for larger farms, has been enhanced by titles, and 
there is a positive correlation between land titling and the use of some inputs and conservation 
techniques.  Fluidity in the land market has not yet been improved, so land titling has not yet had a   16  
significant effect in the transfer of land.  However, the smallest farmers have lower rates of titling and, 
even with titling, more limited access to credit, raising questions about the impact of titling on equity.   
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Table 1.  Use of Inputs and Conservation Techniques by Titled and Untitled Farms. 
 
Input/Technique  Titled Farms (%)  Untitled Farms (%) 
Chemical fertilizer*  98.90  94.85 
Pesticide*  100.00  95.83 
Herbicide*  56.91  44.79 
Fungicide  85.08  85.42 
Soil analysis*  28.80  18.00 
Minimum tillage  5.98  0.00 
Crop rotation  64.8  57.5 
Water ways  5.5  0.0 
* Indicates a Chi-square significance of 5% or better.   21  
Table 2.  Comparison of Agricultural Loans from Commercial Banks and Informal 
Commercial Lenders. 












   22  
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables in Tobit 
Models. 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Log total credit  2.8457  3.8696  0.0000  10.6454 
Log bank credit  1.4417  3.2177  0.0000  10.6454 
Log informal credit  1.0987  2.6166  0.0000  9.6321 
Log total land  1.1876  0.6477  0.0000  2.8679 
Title  0.6296  0.4847  0.0000  1.0000 
Log % farm income  4.4342  0.2781  3.2189  4.6052 
Cotton  0.2963  0.4583  0.0000  1.0000 
Fruit  0.2444  0.4314  0.0000  1.0000 
Vegetable  0.2889  0.4549  0.0000  1.0000 
Log age  4.0746  0.2231  3.2958  4.5539 
Log education  1.2941  0.5528  0.0000  2.3026 
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Table 4.  Estimated Coefficients for Tobit Model of Total Credit Received. 
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Marginal Effects
a 
Constant  -32.4183 
(0.2016) 
 
Log total land  4.2929*** 
(0.0047) 
1.6288 
Title  1.6787 
(0.3695) 
0.6369 
Log % farm income  2.6360 
(0.4559) 
1.0001 
Cotton  8.2637*** 
(0.0086) 
3.1353 
Fruit  5.5285* 
(0.0893) 
2.0975 
Vegetable  7.9821*** 
(0.0107) 
3.0284 
Log age  1.5294 
(0.7180) 
0.5841 
Log education  -0.2262 
(0.8938) 
-0.0858 
s  8.1045   
Significance levels: * Denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and *** denotes 
significance at 1%.  The values in parentheses below the coefficients are the probability |Z|>z.  Log-L=-
217.6005. 
a Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means.   24  
Table 5.  Estimated Coefficients for Tobit Model of Credit Received from 
Commercial Banks and Informal Commercial Lenders. 
Variable  Estimated 
Coefficient 
Marginal Effects




  Commercial Bank  Informal Commercial Lender 
Constant  -39.4582 
(0.9218) 
  -55.8868 
(0.2037) 
 
Log total land  6.0456** 
(0.0413) 
0.2940  5.7866** 
(0.0211) 
0.7071 
Title  6.4670* 
(0.0868) 
0.3145  -2.1746 
(0.4403) 
-0.2658 




-0.3454  9.0561 
(0.2085) 
1.1067 
Cotton  48.8352 
(0.9025) 
2.3748  -4.9556 
(0.2846) 
-0.6056 
Fruit  36.6991 
(0.9267) 
1.7846  1.9170 
(0.6576) 
0.2343 
Vegetable  49.7722 
(0.900) 
2.4204  4.1547 
(0.3035) 
0.5089 
Log age  0.6634 
(0.9379) 
0.0322  1.0174 
(0.8702) 
0.1243 
Log education  0.7082 
(0.8326) 
0.0344  -4.2824 
(0.1073) 
-0.5233 
s  11.0160    9.8101   
Log likelihood  -117.9304    -108.5475   
Significance levels: * Denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, and *** denotes 
significance at 1%.  The values in parentheses below the coefficients are the probability |Z|>z.   
a Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. 